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• After peaking at unprecedented levels (by recent
historical standards) in 1996, net private capital
ﬂows to emerging-market economies (EMEs) fell
to nearly zero in 2000. Since the Asian crisis in
1997, international banks have been aggressively
cutting their exposure to EMES, leading to a sharp
reduction in international bank lending to these
countries.
• In the 1970s and 1980s, private capital ﬂows to
EMEs were concentrated in Latin America. During
the 1990s, the EMES in Asia and Europe became
important destinations for private ﬁnancial ﬂows.
• The 1990s saw a shift to non-debt-creating forms
of capital inﬂows, and direct investment became
the principal source of new capital available to
EMES. Importantly, direct investment has
remained strong in the aftermath of the crises in
EMES in 1997 and 1998. In contrast, other types
of capital ﬂows, particularly interbank lending,
have been ﬂowing out of EMES.
• High expected returns on investment underlay
the rise in private capital ﬂows to EMES. In the
1990s, these ﬂows were boosted by economic and
ﬁnancial liberalization, apparently sound macro-
economic policies and, in some cases, explicit or
implicit government guarantees.
• Notwithstanding the recent decline in capital
ﬂows to EMES, the evidence of the last 30 years
shows that EME capital markets have become
increasingly deep and resilient: not only are
private capital ﬂows more geographically
diversiﬁed than at any time in the past, but so are
lenders and the instruments used to direct capital
to EMES.
he 1990s were turbulent years for many
emerging-market economies (EMES). They
have become progressively integrated in
the world economy and have seen rapid
increases in economic activity, facilitated by a dramatic
expansion in the inﬂow of private capital. Unfortu-
nately, excessive reliance on international capital by
countries ill-prepared to cope with large capital ﬂows
has often been problematic, leading to ﬁnancial crises
with large losses of output.
This article explores the evolving nature of capital
ﬂows to EMES from the onset of the oil-price shocks in
the early 1970s to the year 2000, emphasizing the past
decade. It focuses on the changing nature of these
ﬂows in terms of magnitude, geographical distribu-
tion, type of instruments, and country of origin. The
article also examines the role that the changing investor
base has played in the evolution of these ﬂows, and
provides an overview of the factors underlying the
growth of private capital ﬂows in the 1990s.
Capital markets in EMES have evolved substantially
over the last 30 years and have become increasingly
deep and resilient, notwithstanding the recent
ﬁnancial crises. In contrast to the 1970s, international
banks now provide only a fraction of the ﬁnancing
available to EMEs. Borrowers have become increasingly
diversiﬁed geographically, and there has been a shift
to non-debt-creating investment vehicles.
Capital Flows to EMEs over the Last
30 Years
In the aftermath of the oil-price shocks of the 1970s,
many international commercial banks found them-
selves holding sizable deposits from oil producers
(the so-called petro dollars). Some of these funds
were recycled to the governments of EMES through
syndicated loan arrangements, typically at ﬂoating
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interest rates. Given the sustained increase in
commodity prices and the attendant improvement in
terms of trade during this period, recipient countries
had no difﬁculty servicing these loans. Consequently,
net private capital ﬂows increased almost without
interruption in the 1970s, with the bulk of the ﬂows
directed to Latin America in the form of bank loans
(Table 1 and Chart 1). Net private capital ﬂows peaked
at US$49.8 billion in 1981.
In the early 1980s, however, commodity prices fell
sharply, international interest rates rose to un-
precedented levels, and economic activity in
industrialized countries slumped. This pushed many
EMES into ﬁnancial difﬁculties. Starting with Mexico
in August 1982, a number of Latin American nations
announced moratoriums on their sovereign obliga-
tions. Financial ﬂows to EMES dried up, with net
private ﬂows turning negative in 1984.
Ofﬁcial ﬂows, largely from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and development banks, took up the slack
to a large extent. Throughout the 1980s, the IMF
introduced a number of new lending facilities aimed
at assisting highly indebted developing countries. In
the context of IMFprograms, ofﬁcial bilateral creditors
rescheduled their claims under the aegis of the Paris
Club. Ofﬁcial efforts to encourage commercial banks
to provide new loans to EMES met with little success,
although maturing loans were frequently rescheduled.
Many countries fell into arrears on debt-service
payments. The failure to revive private capital ﬂows
to EMESin the 1980s has led many observers to qualify
this period as the “lost decade,” since the inability of
EMES to access international capital markets impeded
economic activity in a number of these countries.1
Eventually, the Brady Plan of 1989 allowed countries
experiencing debt crises to restructure their debt by
converting existing bank loans into collateralized
bonds at a signiﬁcant discount or at below-market
interest rates.2 The Brady Plan provided debt relief to
the affected debtors. It also resulted in the creation of
debt instruments that were more liquid and, as a
result, more easily tradable. This was the catalyst for
the development of the sovereign EME bond market.
Financial ﬂows to EMES resumed quickly following
the Brady exchanges in the early 1990s. A notable
feature of this period was the surge in the ﬂow of
capital to EMES in Asia, notwithstanding the already
high domestic savings rates (Table 1). Some economists
link this phenomenon to the same factors responsible
for the “Asian Miracle”: high educational spending
and sound macroeconomic policies. According to this
school of thought, given the more educated workforce
and a sound macroeconomic and institutional
1.  For more information on the EME debt crisis, consult Powell (1990).
2.  Brady bonds were collateralized with special zero-coupon U.S. Treasury
bonds.
A Note on the Data Used in this Article
There is no ideal source for data on capital ﬂows to
EMES. This article uses a variety of complementary
data from a number of international organizations.
Data on private capital ﬂows by destination and
aggregate instrument type in Table 1 and Charts 1
and 2 come from the International Monetary
Fund’s (IMF) World Economic Outlook (WEO) data-
base. More detailed data on the disaggregated com-
ponents of gross portfolio ﬂows (Table 2) are from
various issues of the IMF publication, International
Capital Markets. Data on the sectoral destination of
private capital ﬂows (Table 3) are found in the Bank
for International Settlements’ (BIS) publication
International Banking and Financial Market Develop-
ments: International Debt Securities. Data on the
source of private capital ﬂows come from other
sources. Information on direct investment (Table 4)
comes from the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development’s (OECD) International
Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook. Data on the
sources of bank credit to EMES (Table 5) are availa-
ble in the BIS publication International Banking and
Financial Market Developments: International Banking
Statistics.35 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2002
environment, the expected return on an investment
project was perceived as being higher than in other
areas of the world, justifying the inﬂux of capital. A
second and complementary school of thought argues
that much of the ﬂow into Asia was the result of the
collapse of the Japanese economy at the end of the
1980s. Japanese ﬁnancial institutions sought better
investment opportunities abroad and therefore
invested heavily in the east Asian economies.3 Other
observers (e.g., Dooley 1999), remark that the inﬂows
were buoyed by implicit or explicit guarantees that
reduced the perceived risk of investing in emerging
markets.
Regardless of the reason, it is generally acknowledged,
with hindsight, that excessive capital ﬂows were
directed to Asia until 1996. This led to real estate
bubbles in some countries, overvalued real exchange
rates, and inﬂated ﬁnancial-asset prices in most of the
region, thereby sowing the seeds for the Asian crisis in
1997.
Capital ﬂows also returned to other regions during the
ﬁrst half of the 1990s. In volume terms, ﬁnancial ﬂows
to Latin America were several times higher than those
registered in the 1980s, owing partly to market-
friendly economic policies. In addition, ﬂows to the
transition economies of central and eastern Europe
became more signiﬁcant as these economies were
liberalized. Investors were not only quick to capitalize
on the privatization of state enterprises, but also to
take advantage of the well-educated workforce in
these countries and their proximity to western
Europe. As a result, the transition economies were the
recipients of important capital ﬂows through the
period.
After peaking at nearly US$250 billion in 1996, capital
ﬂows to EMES slowed sharply throughout the rest of
the decade (Chart 1). This reﬂected the bursting of the
Asian bubble in 1997 and subsequent crises in Russia
(1998) and Brazil (1999). The sharp swing of Asian
current account balances from deficits to sizable
surpluses, caused in part by the Asian crisis, also
reduced the demand for foreign capital. By 2000, net
private capital ﬂows to EMES had fallen to less than
US$10 billion. As was the case during the mid-1980s,
the decline in private sector ﬂows to EMES during the
3.  See King (2001). According to this school of thought, lending by Japanese
banks to Asian debtors was as proﬂigate as that which led to the collapse of
the Japanese real estate market in the late 1980s. Financial ﬂows from Japan
created asset-price bubbles in Thailand, and possibly in other countries, that
eventually burst and sparked the Asian crisis.
Chart 1
Net Private Capital Flows to EME Borrowers by
Geographic Area
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Table 1
Net Private Capital Flows to EMEs
US$ billions
Average
1971–79 1980–89 1990–99 1971–99 2000
17.8 16.3 124.0 63.3 8.9
3.6 11.9 89.4 36.0 146.2
0.5 5.0 48.1 23.2 -4.3
11.7 -0.7 -13.5 -4.6 -133.0
5.6 11.4 38.2 18.8 -16.0
1.3 4.7 39.5 15.6 46.8
0.1 1.1 11.9 4.5 3.7
4.2 5.6 -13.2 -1.3 -66.4
12.7 9.0 46.8 23.2 37.9
2.6 5.5 30.8 13.3 62.5
0.2 0.4 23.9 8.5 4.6
9.9 3.1 -7.9 1.4 -29.2
n/a n/a 12.3 n/a 2.2
n/a n/a 10.4 n/a 22.5
n/a n/a 6.8 n/a 4.3
n/a n/a -4.8 n/a -24.7
-0.6 -4.1 26.7 8.9 -15.2
-0.3 1.6 8.7 -3.3 14.4
0.2 3.5 5.5 3.4 -16.9
-2.4 -9.3 12.4 0.1 -12.7
14.3 28.1 28.4 7.2 -3.6
Source: IMF, WEO database. Totals may not sum because of missing observations in some
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late 1990s was partly offset by an increase in ofﬁcial
lending by the IMF and by development banks. Such
ﬂows peaked at slightly over US$60 billion in 1997.
Composition of capital ﬂows
Because of their experience during the 1980s, the
emergence of an active market for the bonds of EMES
as a result of the Brady Plan, and developments in
Asia and in central and eastern Europe in the early
1990s, major international and commercial banks
retreated from short-term, balance-of-payments
ﬁnancing. This led to a gradual shift in the nature of
capital ﬂows.
As Chart 2 and Table 1 demonstrate, bank lending
(“other net ﬂows”) has been highly volatile in recent
years. While initially an important component of capital
inflows in the early 1990s, bank lending was sharply
curtailed after the Asian crisis in 1997–98. The direction
of these ﬂows has reversed since 1997, as international
banks have decreased their claims on EMES, principally
by reducing interbank exposures.
Portfolio investment (investments in bonds and equi-
ties) was the principal source of ﬁnancing available to
EMES in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s (Chart 2). Table 2,
which is based on gross portfolio ﬂows, shows that
most of these ﬂows took the form of bonds. These data
also indicate, however, that equity investments have
risen rapidly, increasing nearly twentyfold over the
1990–99 period.
Chart 2
Net Private Capital Flows to EME Borrowers by
Type of Financing
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The decade also witnessed a substantial rise in direct
investment ﬂows. While accounting for only a small
portion of total private capital ﬂows in the early 1990s,
direct investments are now the principal source of
financing for EMES. One striking aspect of direct invest-
ments in EMES has been their resilience. They have
actually increased, even through the Asian, Russian,
and Brazilian crises.
In conjunction with the greater
signiﬁcance of equity investment, the
importance of direct investment
implies that the large majority of net
private ﬁnancial ﬂows to EMES are
now non-debt-creating.
In conjunction with the greater signiﬁcance of equity
investment, the importance of direct investment
implies that the large majority of net private ﬁnancial
ﬂows to EMES are now non-debt-creating.4 This differ-
entiates the 1990s from previous historical episodes.
Furthermore, the long-term nature of these ﬂows indi-
cates that investors are more willing to commit long-
term funds to EMES. This may be a reﬂection of some
of the steps taken by these countries to make their
economies more attractive to such commitments.
Sectoral breakdown
In general, EME governments have been the largest
borrowers on international debt markets. Statistics
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from the BIS reveal that the share of government and
agency debt as a proportion of total international
indebtedness has increased almost 10 percentage
points since 1993 (Table 3).5 This has been accom-
panied by a reduction in the share for ﬁnancial institu-
tions and a slightly increasing share for the non-ﬁnan-
cial corporate sector.
The aggregate data in Table 3 hide important regional
differences in the sectoral allocation of ﬂows. In Euro-
pean EMES, most of the portfolio ﬂows have been
directed to ﬁnancing government activities, whereas
in Asia and the Paciﬁc, such ﬂows account for less
than a third of the total. In Latin America and the
Caribbean, the government’s share of portfolio ﬂows
has been increasing rapidly, from less than a quarter of
the total in 1993 to more than half six years later. By
1999, in all three cases, the smallest portion of portfolio
ﬂows was going to ﬁnancial institutions.
In dollar terms, the indebtedness of the ﬁnancial
sector has remained relatively constant since the
Asian crisis. However, ﬁnancial institutions in many
EMES have beneﬁted from substantial inﬂows of
foreign direct investment (FDI).These are not captured


















Sectoral Breakdown of International Indebtedness
Per cent of total
1993 1996 1999 1993–99
(average)
41 44 51 45
26 23 14 21
33 33 34 34
84 93 81 86
15 6 8 10
12 1 1 4
37 27 32 31
23 29 20 25
40 44 48 45
23 46 54 41
33 22 14 23
44 32 32 36
Source: BIS, International Banking and Financial Market Developments: International Debt
Securities. Based on year-end values. Includes outstanding international bonds, notes,
and money market instruments.
a. Includes emerging markets in Europe, Asia and the Paciﬁc, and Latin America. Africa
and the Middle East are included in the total but are not reported separately. Totals
may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
in the BIS statistics.6 Furthermore, there is substantial
foreign ownership of ﬁnancial institutions in many
EMES. Consequently, capital has been transferred from
parent institutions to subsidiaries or branches without
being captured in statistics on international
indebtedness.
Interestingly, the history of recent ﬁnancial crises can
be traced through Table 3. The Asian crisis was rooted
in the corporate sector (both financial and non-
ﬁnancial); Table 3 shows that this sector was the most
indebted at the time of the crisis. In Latin America and
in Russia, ﬁnancial concerns in the 1990s centred on
high government debt burdens. Again, Table 3 shows
that this sector was the most indebted in these regions.
Origin of private capital ﬂows
Foreign direct investment
Over the 1990–98 period, the United States was the
largest provider of FDI to EMES (Table 4).7 But most of
the capital ﬂowing out of the United States has been
directed to Latin America, where commercial and
historical ties are strong. In general, direct investment
ﬂows tend to follow commercial and/or historical
links. Direct investment in emerging European
markets is dominated by the European members of
the G-7, while direct investment in Asia and the Paciﬁc
originates predominantly in Japan. Geographic
proximity, cultural similarities, and availability of
information are important determinants of the origins
of private capital ﬂows.
Over the 1990–98 period, the United
States was the largest provider of FDI
to EMES.
European FDI in EMES rose by over 350 per cent in the
period from 1990 to 1998. Some of this can be explained
6.  The BIS statistics on international debt securities also exclude bank loans.
7.  The data in Table 4 differ from those presented in Table 1 for a number of
reasons. First, the data presented in Table 4 are on a gross basis, while Table 1
presents data on net capital ﬂows. Second, the data in Table 4 include direct
investment ﬂows from only six countries, while the data in Table 1 include
ﬂows from all regions. Third, data in Table 4 are based on the balance-of-pay-
ments data of the donor country, while the data in Table 1 are based on bal-
ance-of-payments data for the recipient countries. There can be large and
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by the prospect of accession to the European Union
for countries in eastern Europe and by the increased
integration of these countries with western Europe.
Many western European ﬁrms have set up manu-
facturing facilities in European emerging economies
to take advantage of skilled labour forces and relatively
low wages. Advanced European economies have also
been aggressively investing in Latin America,
particularly in the ﬁnancial and rapidly developing
telecommunications sectors (notably in Brazil).
The banking sector
The geographical origin of bank ﬂows to EMES is
similar to that of FDI. In Table 5, the main creditors to
EMES are given as a proportion of total lending. Over
the 1990–99 period, BIS data show that most bank
lending to EMES originated in Europe. In fact, lending
to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East is dominated
by European banks. This is not unexpected, given the
commercial and colonial ties linking these regions.
More surprising is the large share of lending by
European banks to countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean. European banks, particularly those in
Spain, aggressively expanded their activities in Latin
Emerging-market economies (total)b
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Sources of Foreign Direct Investment for EMEs
US$ billions
1990 1994 1998a 1990–98
(average)
29.6 53.1 57.3 49.4
5.4 10.5 19.1 13.1
13.3 26.9 24.9 22.7
11.0 15.7 13.3 13.6
0.3 1.6 6.2 2.5
0.3 0.8 5.3 1.8
0.0 0.9 0.9 0.7
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
11.3 24.5 11.1 19.4
1.2 3.9 0.1 4.1
2.9 10.8 4.7 6.7
7.2 9.8 6.4 8.7
16.6 23.4 29.6 22.7
2.8 4.4 9.3 5.0
10.1 13.8 13.9 13.4
3.6 5.2 6.3 4.3
Source: OECD data from the International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook. Data are
aggregated using yearly average exchange rates.
a. Most recent data
b. Includes emerging markets in Europe, Asia and the Paciﬁc, and Latin America. Africa
and the Middle East are included in the total but are not reported separately.
America throughout the 1990s.8 This can be seen from
the steady increase in the share of lending by
European banks to Latin America.
Over the 1990–99 period, lending to Asia was
primarily from Japanese banks, although Table 5
shows a dramatic drop-off in Japanese lending
following the Asian crisis. Proportionally, Japanese
lending has fallen to less than half of its 1990 level in
response to the Asian crisis and to domestic ﬁnancial
difﬁculties. Over the 1990s, the share of lending to
EMES by North American banks has remained
constant at about 17 per cent of total international
bank lending.
Changing investor base
In line with the changing nature of the ﬁnancial
instruments used, the EME investor base has also
changed in recent years, with implications for future
ﬁnancial flows. During the 1970s and 1980s, syndicated
bank loans were the primary source of ﬁnancing
available to EMEs. The development of bond and
equity markets in EMES brought a different class of
investor to these countries. Broadly speaking, the





















Sources of Bank Lending to EMEs
Per cent of total bank lending
1990 1995 1999 1990–99
(average)
42 49 59 50
49 60 57 56
23 33 48 34
65 79 80 76
39 49 58 49
18 17 17 17
10 9 13 10
13 11 11 12
56 7 6
32 35 28 32
26 22 12 20
11 7 6 9
52 43 27 42
20 7 3 9
19 7 4 10
Source: BIS, International Banking and Financial Market Developments: International
Banking Statistics. Data available only as of 1990.39 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2002
1990s saw the development of two generic investor
types: crossover investors and dedicated investors.
The ﬁrst type of investor is generally unconstrained in
its choice of investments. For a given risk level,
crossover investors seek to maximize their returns,
either through investments in industrialized countries
or in emerging markets. Hence, ﬁnancial ﬂows of
crossover investors tend to be more volatile, since
funds are shifted from one asset to another with
relatively little constraint. Many hedge funds, for
instance, are crossover investors. Dedicated investors
are those bound by self-imposed restrictions on either
the asset class (bonds or equities, for instance) or
various deﬁnitions of location. Dedicated investors
may direct their investments to emerging markets in
general, or may impose more precise constraints, such
as Brazilian equities. Dedicated investors, such as
those investing in emerging-market funds, will often
track emerging-market equity or bond indexes, such
as JP Morgan’s Emerging Market Bond Index Plus, or
various Morgan Stanley Capital International
Indexes.9
Although dedicated investors can always liquidate
their positions, crossover investors are often
associated with the volatile nature of portfolio ﬂows
to EMES, given their typically short-term investment
perspective.10 While good data are not available on
the nature of the EME investor base, anecdotal
evidence suggests that crossover investors are less
important now than in the late 1990s.11
Both types of investors generally seek to diversify the
risk of investing. For crossover investors, this may
mean investing a portion of their portfolio in ﬁnancial
markets which display little co-movement. However,
the inﬂux of portfolio ﬂows to EMES has, at times, led
to an apparent synchronization of movements in EME
sovereign spreads with those of equity markets and
representative high-risk investment indexes in
9.  Dedicated investors, nevertheless, have considerable latitude regarding
their investment decisions. Regional investors, such as those dedicated to
central Europe, must decide which instrument and/or which country to
invest in based on their analysis. Investors that follow emerging-market bond
indexes must make judgments about sovereign risk and whether or not some
countries should be over- or underweighted. Investors dedicated to a particu-
lar country must decide whether they should invest in cash, equities, or short-
or long-term securities.
10. It is clear from Chart 2 that bank lending (“other net ﬂows”) has also been
volatile through the years.
11.  For instance, a recent study by JP Morgan ﬁnds that hedge funds now
make up 10 per cent of emerging-market debt instruments. At the time of the
Russian default, hedge funds accounted for 35 to 40 per cent of this market.
advanced economies. The result has been a narrowing
of the returns to investors in these countries, such that
the risk-reward payoff may not justify investment in
EMES to crossover investors; i.e., risk is less diversiﬁed
when investing in EME assets. This is demonstrated in
Chart 3, which plots net portfolio ﬂows to EMES
versus the 18-month rolling correlation between the
JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index and the
spread between U.S. high-yield bonds (junk bonds)
and U.S. Treasuries. As this correlation (i.e., risk
diversiﬁcation has decreased), portfolio investment in
EMEShas declined.12 Because of the increased linkages
between ﬁnancial markets in advanced economies
and those in EMES, as well as the reduced opportunity
for diversiﬁcation of risk, some observers believe that
portfolio ﬂows to EMES might be permanently
reduced.
What Determines Capital Flows to
EMEs?
With the notable exception of certain Asian
economies, EMES typically have low domestic savings
relative to investment opportunities that are proﬁtable
at rates of return required by foreign investors. These
required rates of return are determined on the basis of
12.  This is a demonstrative example, as the level of portfolio investment in
EMEs has also been affected by the Asian crisis, among other developments.
Chart 3
Correlation between EMBI and Spreads on High-
Risk U.S. Corporate Debt
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the risk-adjusted return on alternative investment
projects. Factors that might affect the availability and
attractiveness of investment opportunities in EMES for
foreign investors include the domestic macro-
economic environment, government restrictions on
inward investment, and policies that might alter the
perceived riskiness of investments. The supply of
foreign capital depends on competing rates of return
in creditor countries, and the regulatory environment
in these countries.
Factors that might affect the
availability and attractiveness of
investment opportunities in EMES for
foreigninvestorsincludethedomestic
macroeconomic environment,
government restrictions on inward
investment, and policies that might
alter the perceived riskiness of
investments.
Debtor-speciﬁc factors
Foreign investors may invest in EMES to take advantage
of local macroeconomic developments or to set up
manufacturing facilities in low-cost production
localities for export purposes. When GDP growth is
high, the expected proﬁtability of local investments is
high, which attracts foreign capital. Firms also invest
in EMES to take advantage of low-cost skilled labour.
In these cases, production is usually exported back to
advanced economies. Chart 4 demonstrates a clear
linkage between growth in EMEs and net private
capital inﬂows.13
The easing of restrictions on foreign ownership and
privatization have also contributed to foreign invest-
ment in EMES. Economic liberalization during the late
1980s and through the 1990s led many EME govern-
13.  The linkage between GDP growth in EMEs and net private capital ﬂows
could also be the result of reverse causation: that GDP growth in EMEs is
higher because of an increase in net private capital ﬂows. More likely, it is a
combination of both factors: capital ﬂows are higher when GDP growth is
strong, but capital inﬂows are also required to fuel robust growth.
ments, particularly those in eastern Europe, to
dramatically reduce the extent of government involve-
ment in the economy. Many nations underwent large-
scale privatization programs, selling off state companies
to domestic and foreign investors. This resulted not
only in capital flows at the time of the purchase/
investment, but often led to signiﬁcant future ﬂows
as the privatized entities were recapitalized and
expanded.
Changes in domestic ﬁnancial and legal frameworks
also lead to inﬂows of private capital by reducing
transactions costs and/or the degree of risk of
investing in EMES. Some countries modiﬁed their legal
systems to more fully enshrine property rights. Others
chose to liberalize capital account transactions. This
made it easier and less costly for foreigners to invest
in, but also to withdraw their money from, EMES.14 A
more recent change in EMEShas been the liberalization
of domestic ﬁnancial markets. This has allowed some
EMES to develop deeper ﬁnancial markets, providing
investors with more opportunity to risk-proof their
investments (through hedging, for instance).
However, government policies can also lead to excessive
or unwarranted inﬂows of capital. As noted earlier,the
14. Capital account liberalization has allowed private pension funds in some
EMEs to invest in the assets of advanced economies, leading to a decline in net
portfolio ﬂows to EMEs. This trend is expected to continue in the foreseeable
future.
Chart 4
Net Private Capital Flows to EMEs
Source: IMF, WEO database
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provision of implicit or explicit guarantees—such as
ﬁxingexchangerates—toforeigninvestorswillreduce
the perceived risks of investments and thus lead to
increased capital flows.15 Sterilized intervention in
the foreign exchange market will also contribute to
larger capital ﬂows, all other things being equal.
Since the central bank offsets the expansionary
impact of capital flows on the monetary base, domestic
interest rates remain unchanged. Consequently, the
relative attractiveness of EME assets is not reduced,
and capital ﬂows persist.
Investors face difﬁculties in collecting information
about investment projects in EMES. This has the effect
of restraining such foreign investment by increasing
transactions costs and risk. This leads to home bias,
which is the observed phenomenon that investor
portfolios are much less diversiﬁed geographically
than theory suggests they should be. Until recently,
this was a severe problem in many EMES (which partly
explains why bank loans were the principal form of
credit available to EMES prior to the Brady Plan).16
Advances in information and communication
technology in the 1990s have made it easier and less
costly to evaluate and monitor investments in EMES,
thus allowing investors to more readily quantify risk.
Although the relationship between advances in
information and communication technology and
increased capital ﬂows in the 1990s may be difﬁcult to
document empirically, it stands to reason that these
changes have increased capital ﬂows.17 Recent efforts
by governments in EMES to improve the timeliness,
reliability, and extent of economic and ﬁnancial
information may pay off in enhanced foreign inﬂows
in the future.
Lack of both information and transparency in
government policies has occasionally made it difﬁcult
for investors to assess and price risk, particularly in
times of turmoil. Delays in the availability—or
outright unavailability—and misreporting of key
economic data have also hindered the ability of
investors to correctly assess the risk of speciﬁc
investment projects.
15.  Though difﬁcult to verify empirically, this is thought to have been a
serious problem, particularly in some of the Asian EMEs.
16.  While much improved from the 1970s and 1980s, informational
problems remain substantial in most EMEs. This is one factor behind the
recent focus on implementing international standards and codes in EMEs.
17.  The main problem with establishing this empirical link relates to measu-
ring and quantifying advances in information and communication technology.
Creditor-speciﬁc factors
From a theoretical perspective, one of the most
important and fundamental factors determining
capital ﬂows are risk-adjusted international interest
rates—i.e., interest rates in industrialized countries.
When choosing where to invest and what to invest in,
rational investors compare the rates of return on a set
of investment alternatives. If interest rates in inter-
national capital markets are low, then these investors
will typically seek more rewarding alternatives (while
accounting for the riskiness of the investment).
Consequently, an inverse relationship between U.S.
interest rates (which are often used as a proxy for
international interest rates) and capital ﬂows to EMES
has been identiﬁed, though this relationship is far
from robust.18
Changes in the regulatory environment in many
industrialized countries have given investors more
opportunities to diversify their portfolios, and in so
doing has allowed them to invest in countries where
rates of return are higher. In Canada, for instance, the
government increased the limits on holdings of
foreign assets in registered retirement savings plans
from 20 per cent in the 1990s to 30 per cent in 2001,
allowing Canadians to hold more foreign assets in
their retirement savings plans.
Contagion
Throughout much of the 1990s, capital flows to
individual EMES have been strongly correlated. Some
degree of co-movement is expected in EME asset
prices as international ﬁnancial markets have become
increasingly integrated and EMES have been, at times,
hit by common shocks. Occasionally, however, this co-
movement appears to have been exaggerated, given
traditional economic and ﬁnancial linkages.19 Part of
this may be the result of opaque government policies,
such as so-called soft pegs. Contagion, as such
excessive correlations are often described, was a
deﬁning feature of international capital markets in the
1990s and has led to serious economic dislocations in
some cases.20 As Chart 5 demonstrates, bond spreads
18.  See for instance Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993), Fernandez-Arias
(1996), and Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998).
19.  See Kruger, Osakwe, and Page (1998) for more information on the link
between economic fundamentals and contagion.
20.  There is some disagreement over the deﬁnition of the concept of conta-
gion. There is, however, broad agreement that contagion means interdepen-
dence in ﬁnancial market outcomes that is excessive given macroeconomic
fundamentals. See Masson (1998).42 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2002
in EMES became increasingly or excessively correlated
duringtheﬁnancialcrisesidentiﬁedinthehighlighted
sections of the chart.
Contagion . . . was a deﬁning feature
of international capital markets in the
1990s and has led to serious economic
dislocations in some cases.
More recently, contagion seems to be less of a problem.
Investors have become more discriminating, resulting
in less co-movement in EME bond spreads.21 Much of
the increase in differentiation of risk by investors
may be related to the generally sound macro-
economic policies followed by many EME countries
since the Asian/Russian/Brazilian crises, and to
measures that improved the international ﬁnancial
architecture, such as the wider adoption of ﬂexible
21.  The reader is referred to IMF (2001a, 20).
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exchange rates and reforms that have enhanced the
transparency of monetary and fiscal policies. The
increased availability of timely and accurate infor-
mation in conjunction with better macroeconomic
policies should allow investors to further reﬁne their
risk analyses. Thus, contagion is likely to become a
less-important determinant in the ﬂow of private
capital to EMES in the future.
Conclusion
Capital ﬂows to EMES have changed signiﬁcantly over
the last 30 years. Borrowers in EMES are now more
geographically diversiﬁed and are more reliant on
bond ﬁnancing than on the bank loans of 30 years ago.
Direct investment has become the dominant source
of ﬁnancing. Governments remain the principal
borrowers, but the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector is
also an increasingly important recipient of private
capital ﬂows. These changes, in conjunction with
recent improvements in data standards and trans-
parency, as well as better ﬁnancial regulation and
supervision, have made capital markets in EMES
deeper and more resilient than in the past. Private
capital ﬂows should continue to contribute to the
future economic development of these countries.
Generally, private capital ﬂows to EMES are a function
of anticipated returns and risk. These, in turn, have
been affected by economic and ﬁnancial liberalization,
growth prospects, macroeconomic policies, and
advances in information and communication
technology.
Reliant on international capital markets for a portion
of their funding requirements, EMES need to continue
to implement policies that allow them to maximize the
beneﬁts from such exposure. These policies should
seek to encourage capital ﬂows of a longer maturity,
ensure a sound macroeconomic and ﬁnancial
environment, and allow international investors to
make informed judgments about macroeconomic
prospects through increased data dissemination and
transparency.22
22.  For a detailed review of the policy implications of the changing interna-
tional ﬁnancial architecture, see Powell (2001).43 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2002
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